The battle for Lake Chad has entered a new and unpredictable phase. For years, the waters and islands of the lake have been portrayed as a “grey zone”—part sanctuary, part battleground—where the Nigerian military, insurgent groups, and regional partners compete for influence. But events between 5 and 10 November 2025 have forced a recalibration of this narrative.
On one hand, the Nigerian Navy (NN) has demonstrated that it still maintains a defensive presence along its designated corridors, successfully repelling an ISWAP assault on its Fish Dam base. On the other, Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have fought one of the largest inter-jihadist battles recorded in the region, involving motorised boats, island assaults, and a level of maritime mobility that highlights a long-standing structural problem: insurgents operate freely in parts of the lake where the state is absent.

The question—Who controls Lake Chad?—is therefore not only tactical. It is a strategic assessment of governance, access, and who exerts coercive power at any given time.

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1. The Nigerian Navy’s Position: Strong but Localised

Contrary to online speculation, the Nigerian Navy has not lost Lake Chad. Its ability to repel the ISWAP attack on 10 November 2025 proves two things:

1. Its bases remain intact.

2. Its riverine units still hold firm defensive capability.

The attempted raid on Fish Dam was meant to destroy newly-acquired Navy equipment used for clearing waterways—machinery that threatens ISWAP’s smuggling and mobility networks. Instead, the terrorists suffered heavy casualties. NN forces, backed by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and Nigerian Air Force, forced the attackers into retreat.

But the Navy’s presence is not omnipresent. The lake is over 26,000 square kilometres, filled with marshes, shifting islands, and shallow waterways that conventional boats struggle to navigate. The Nigerian Navy dominates its immediate operational zones, especially around its bases, but the larger lake—especially the island clusters—remains contested.

What the Navy controls is access to Nigeria’s shoreline and key military outposts. What it does not control is the entire network of islands used as insurgent strongholds.

2. The Boko Haram vs ISWAP “Naval Battle”: A Parallel War

From 5–8 November, Boko Haram launched what can only be described as a “naval invasion” against ISWAP across multiple islands. Footage widely circulated online shows:

• Motorised boats used in coordinated assaults

• Boko Haram fighters overwhelming ISWAP positions

• Captured weapons, ammunition, and at least seven boats

• Mass casualties:

  • 150–200 ISWAP fighters killed

  • Only four Boko Haram fighters reported dead

This was not a skirmish. It was the largest Lake Chad maritime insurgent battle since 2014–2015.

Boko Haram’s objective was clear:
Reclaim lost lake territory and push ISWAP back to the mainland.

The outcome?
Boko Haram succeeded. ISWAP lost multiple island bases, suffered catastrophic manpower losses, and ceded operational space.

But the Nigerian Navy did not participate in this “naval battle.” Why?

Why the Navy Didn’t Intervene

• The Navy was under attack at Fish Dam during the same window.

• The inter-jihadist fight occurred deep inside insurgent-held islands far from Navy positions.

• The lake’s terrain makes rapid deployment nearly impossible.

• From a counter-insurgency standpoint, watching terrorists destroy each other is strategically beneficial—so long as it doesn’t threaten military or civilian positions.

This is why both Boko Haram and ISWAP continue to operate “mini-fleets” on the lake. They exploit areas too shallow, too marshy, or too remote for the state to dominate permanently.

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3. So Who Controls Lake Chad?

The answer is fragmented:

The Nigerian Navy controls:

• Its bases (Fish Dam, Baga axis, other forward operating locations)

• Shoreline security zones

• Formal navigational corridors

• Joint patrol operations with MNJTF partners

The Navy ensures that the Nigerian state has a foothold, preventing ISWAP from encircling or overrunning strategic areas.

Boko Haram currently controls:

• The majority of the disputed Lake Chad islands following their victory

• Captured ISWAP boats and weapons

• Key smuggling and fishing routes formerly held by ISWAP

Their victory marks a resurgence of the Shekau faction’s territorial footprint.

ISWAP controls:

• Mainland fallback positions

• A reduced number of island staging points

• Some logistical corridors into Niger and Cameroon

ISWAP remains dangerous but is now significantly weakened inside the lake basin.

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4. Strategic Implications

• Terrorist infighting benefits Nigeria in the short term by degrading ISWAP.

• In the medium term, a stronger Boko Haram with expanded island control presents a different threat.

• The Nigerian Navy needs:

  • More shallow-draft assault boats

  • Drone-supported reconnaissance over the islands

  • Permanent occupation of key reclaimed islands

• MNJTF partners must coordinate more aggressively; otherwise, insurgent “naval wars” will continue in ungoverned spaces.

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Conclusion

No single actor controls the entire Lake Chad.
But the balance of power—at least for now—stands as follows:

• The Nigerian Navy controls what the state must control.

• Boko Haram controls the islands it just conquered.

• ISWAP controls whatever it has not yet lost.

Lake Chad remains a contested battlespace—a fluid warzone where sovereignty, insurgency, and geography collide.

Majemite Jaboro Deence Analyst for Felastory Media